Introduction
Federal regulations ͑10CFR71͒ require packages that transport large quantities of radioactive materials ͑type B packages͒ to withstand a test sequence consisting of a 10 m drop onto an unyielding surface, a 1 m drop onto a puncture bar, and a 30 minute fully engulfing fire ͓1͔. Damage sustained from each event is not repaired before initiation of the subsequent event. At the conclusion of this sequence, the containment, shielding, and criticality functions of the package must be maintained. This regulatory sequence is estimated to be more severe than 99.4% of all transportation accidents ͓2͔. However, risk assessment studies must consider the likelihood and consequence of all scenarios that are possible during transport campaigns ͓3͔.
The performance of packages under regulatory and other severe thermal events is evaluated by both testing and analysis. Thermal analyses typically involve the construction of finite element ͑FE͒ models of intact or damaged packages. First, the steady state package temperatures are calculated for a normal transport environment. These temperatures are then used as initial conditions to calculate the time-dependent package temperatures during a fire. Finally, the package temperatures at the end of the fire are used as initial conditions for a time-dependent postfire calculation.
Regulatory evaluations subject the package, which is damaged during the earlier drop and puncture events, to a 30 minute fully engulfing fire. The temperatures of the containment seal, gamma shield, fuel cladding, and other important components are monitored during and after the simulated fire. The goal is to assure that these components do not exceed their temperatures of concern.
Transportation risk studies go beyond the regulatory evaluation. They begin by assuming that the package satisfies all regulatory requirements. However, they consider the likelihood and consequence of all severe events that the package may creditably experience during transport. Since it is not possible to perform simulations for all events, analysts must differentiate events of concern from those that are not. Events of concern are defined as those that cause one or more cask components to reach a condition of concern. These events may have potential public health consequence and therefore require further study.
For example, the fire duration of concern for a component such as a seal or fuel cladding is the minimum that causes that component to reach its temperature of concern ͓4,5͔. This duration depends on package damage before the fire, fire size and location, and wind conditions. Fires that are shorter than the duration of concern for all package components have no public safety consequences.
Greiner et al. ͓6͔ used the CAFE ͑container analysis fire environment͒ computer code to simulate the response of a generic truck package in 30 h fires. This long duration allowed both transient and steady state package behaviors to be observed. The simulations considered three different fuel pools: a circle ͑2 m diameter͒, a wide trench ͑2 m by 10 m͒, and a narrow trench ͑1 m by 10 m͒. In all simulations, the package was placed at ground level. For each pool, simulations were performed with the package centered over the pool and shifted transverse to the package axis by 1 m. The fire time of concern for the containment seal, gamma shield, and fuel was determined for each fuel pool and package location. This is the time after the fire begins when these components first reach their temperatures of concern.
The temperatures of interior components continue to increase after the fire is extinguished. This is because heat from the hotter outer regions continues to diffuse to them for a period of time. The duration of concern for a component is therefore shorter than its time of concern. The times of concern calculated by Greiner et al. ͓6͔ are useful estimates of the durations of concern. Moreover, that work helps risk analysts understand how the times and durations of concern vary with pool shape and package location.
In the current work, the CAFE code is used to simulate the fire response of the truck package considered in the earlier work ͓6͔. However, the bottom of the package body is now 1.07 m above a 7.2-m-diameter ground level pool. This pool size is substantially larger than the ones considered earlier ͓6͔ but not as large as the size specified by 10CFR71 for regulatory testing of this package. To evaluate the effect of package location, simulations are performed with the package centered over the pool and offset from that location by 1 m and 2.5 m in the direction parallel to the package axis. The simulations are repeated for a package whose impact limiters are not present to evaluate the level of thermal protection they provide. For comparison, simulations are also per-formed using a specified fire temperature and emissivity model that is used as a standard for nuclear waste transport package evaluation ͓1͔.
CAFE Computer Code
The CAFE computer code was developed at Sandia National Laboratories to simulate the response of nuclear waste transport packages to large hydrocarbon pool fires ͓7͔. CAFE links a CFD ͑computational fluid dynamics͒ fire simulator to commercial FE programs such as PATRAN P/thermal or ANSYS. CAFE's fire simulator is identical to the Isis-3D CFD code ͓8͔. It calculates fire behavior and heat transfer from the fire to the package. This heat transfer is dependent on the package surface temperature. The FE code calculates the temperature response of the package. CAFE passes heat transfer information from the fire simulator to the FE package response simulator. It also passes package surface temperature information to the fire simulator. To reduce computational time the fire simulator does not run continuously for the fire duration. CAFE only calls it to run for short durations to update the fire heat transfer at specified intervals.
The fire simulator ͑Isis-3D͒ is a general-purpose threedimensional CFD code that is capable of utilizing highly refined computational meshes. However, it is also capable of employing semiempirical combustion chemistry and radiation heat transfer models ͓8͔. These models have been developed so that the code gives engineering-level accurate heat transfer results for large hydrocarbon pool fires even when relatively course computational grids are employed ͓9͔.
The combustion chemistry and radiation heat transfer models are based on the physics of large fires. However, they employ parameters whose values are determined from measurements in fires that are "similar" to those for which the models are used. The combustion chemistry model employs four separate reactions, two of which produce radiating soot. Reaction rate and soot production parameter values for this model are determined ͓8͔ by comparing Isis-3D simulations with experimental time-dependent measurements of soot temperature and soot volume fraction at one location within a 6 m by 6 m JP8 pool fire under low wind conditions ͓10͔.
The radiation heat transfer model is also based on the properties of large pool fires. Fires from liquid hydrocarbon pools with diameters greater than 2 m have relatively high volume fractions of thermally radiation soot particles ͓11͔. This makes the fire region optically dense and diffusely radiating. Radiation heat transfer in such media is accurately represented using the Rosseland thermal conductivity method ͓12͔. CAFE employs a user defined minimum soot volume fraction f S,m to define the edge of the fire zone. In computational cells where the soot volume fraction f S exceeds the edge value ͑f S Ͼ f S,m ͒, radiation heat transfer is calculated using the Rosseland method. The "clear" media outside the fire zone ͑where f S Ͻ f S,m ͒ utilizes viewfactor radiation to calculate surface to surface heat transfer. Since the calculated soot concentration changes at each time step, the regions where the optically thick and clear approximations apply also change.
The value of f S,m is chosen so that the fire surface radiant energy calculated by Isis-3D agrees with measured data presented in the Society of Fire Protection Engineering Handbook ͓13͔. Isis-3D simulations of a 7.2-m-diameter pool fire were performed with a range of f S,m ͓14,15͔. The value f S,m = 0.5ϫ 10 −6 ͑0.5 ppm͒ gives the best agreement between the simulation results and measured data for this fire size. This value is used in all subsequent simulations in this paper.
Benchmark experiment Two large-scale fire tests were performed to measure the response of a pipe calorimeter in a large fire ͓16͔. Data from one of these tests have been used to benchmark CAFE simulations ͓14,15͔. In this paper, we calculate the response of a generic truck package to the conditions of the benchmark experiment. That experiment and the benchmark simulation methods are now described. Figure 1͑a͒ is a photograph of the test facility. It shows a carbon steel pipe calorimeter suspended 1 m above the center of a 7.2-m-diameter JP8 fuel pool before the test. The fuel floats on top of a 1-m-deep water pool. A sheet metal dam contains the fuel so that it forms a circle. The pipe diameter, length, and wall thickness are 1.22 m ͑4 ft͒, 4.57 m ͑15 ft͒, and 2.54 cm ͑1 in.͒, respectively, and it has 2.54-cm ͑1 in.͒-thick caps on each end. It is roughly the size of a legal weight truck package. However, truck packages typically have large impact limiters on each end ͑see Fig. 4͑a͒͒ . Figure 1͑b͒ shows a plan view of the facility. The calorimeter, water pool, fuel dam, and compass directions are shown. The test facility is surrounded by a series of wind fences, which are also seen in Fig. 1͑a͒ . Gaps between these fences allow the natural indraft of air toward the fire but are intended to reduce the effect of wind. This type of wind fence is typically employed during regulatory testing. Enough fuel is placed in the pool to burn for roughly 30 min. The calorimeter interior temperature was measured at 47 locations using thermocouples. Their time-dependent temperatures were recorded to measure the calorimeter response to the fire.
The wind speed and direction during the fire were measured at two elevations, 3.1 m and 6 m above the ground, on a pole outside the barriers. The anemometer pole location is shown in Fig.  1͑b͒ . Figure 2 shows the wind speed and direction measured during the test. During the first 17 min, the wind blew toward the northwest ͑to the lower right in Fig. 1͑b͒͒ with an average speed of 1 m / s ͑2.2 mile/ h͒. The wind speed was low between t = 17 min and 27 min. After that time, it blew toward the east ͑to the left in Fig. 1͑b͒͒ with increasing speed. Movies of the experiment show that the wind tilted and moved the fire volume. This affected the portion of the calorimeter engulfed in the flames. While the wind fences may have reduced the effect of the wind on the fire, it did not eliminate it. Figure 3 shows the Isis-3D computational domain used to benchmark simulation results ͓14,15͔. The domain is 60 m, 10 m, and 60 m long in the x, y, and z directions, respectively. It has 50, 
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Transactions of the ASME 22, and 50 grids in these respective directions, for a total of 55,000 elements. The measured wind conditions presented in Fig.  2 are applied to the side boundaries of the domain. The domain includes the calorimeter whose material properties and dimensions are the same as those of the experiment. Fuel vapor is injected at a uniform rate of 0.072 kg/ m 2 s from the 7.2-m-diameter ground level pool ͓17͔. The wind present during the experiment and the resistance to it ͑drag͒ provided by the fences affect the flame coverage of the calorimeter and the heat transfer to it. A thin plate orifice model of the wind fence was developed to represent its drag. Simulations of the benchmark experiment were performed with the wind fence, fuel pool, radiation heat transfer, and reaction chemistry models. The package temperature response from these simulations was in good agreement with the measured data. Figure 4 shows three-dimensional FE models of intact and noimpact-limiter versions of a generic legal-weight-truck package. These models were created using the PATRAN FE package. The intact package dimensions and material properties are similar but not identical to those of a currently licensed package designed to transport one spent pressurized water reactor ͑PWR͒ fuel assembly ͓18͔.
Transport Package Model
Figures 5͑a͒ and 5͑b͒ show axial and cross-sectional slices through the intact package. The location of the cross section in Fig. 5͑b͒ is shown in Fig. 5͑a͒ as Section AA. Regions in the figure are shaded according to their material. The fuel and basket components in real packages have rectangular cross sections. However, they have been rounded in the current work to allow the use of an axissymmetric model. The innermost cylinder with a radius of 8.5 cm and a length of 3.66 m represents the spent fuel payload. Its sides are surrounded by an aluminum basket with an inner radius of 12.7 cm and a thickness of 4.1 cm. The gaps on the sides and ends of the fuel are filled with air. A stainless steel containment vessel surrounds these components. The sidewall thickness of this vessel is 1.9 cm. The vessel sides are surrounded by a 14.5-cm-thick lead gamma shield. A 4.8 cm-thick stainless steel cask body surrounds this shield. A 12.7-cm-thick neutron shield tank surrounds the outer shell. This tank does not cover a 22.9-cm-long region on the lefthand side of the containment vessel. The outer skin of the neutron shield is constructed of 0.635-cm-thick stainless steel.
The neutron shield tank contains an ethylene glycol/water solution during normal transport conditions that exist before the fire simulation. During the fire and postfire simulations, this tank is assumed to contain only air. This is a standard practice for package analysis based on the likelihood of a puncture during accident conditions. It may also conservatively overpredict the maximum temperatures experience by the package components. The outermost region of the main package body is an expansion tank for the neutron shield fluid. The tank is 5.7 cm thick, and its outer skin is constructed of 0.635-cm-thick stainless steel.
A spent nuclear fuel assembly is loaded into the package by removing the impact limiter and a bolted closure on the left-hand side of Fig. 5͑a͒ . The massive stainless steel cylinder on this "closure" end consists of two parts. The first is a circular flange that is permanently attached to the package body. The second is a closure that is bolted to the flange. The axial location of a 45.2-cm-diameter elastomer gasket that seals the interface between the flange and this closure is shown in Fig. 5͑a͒ using a dotted line. The cylindrical steel-lead-steel sandwich structure on the right-hand side of Fig. 5͑a͒ is permanently attached to the package body. This structure has a 7.6-cm-thick, 52.8-cm-diameter cylinder of lead encapsulated in a 26.7-cm-thick, 72.6-cm-diameter stainless steel cylinder.
Conduction heat transfer within the solid steel, lead, and aluminum components and the air employ standard computational methods and material properties ͓19͔. Thermal effects of phase change ͑heat of fusion͒ are modeled for the lead gamma shield and the aluminum basket. The possible effects of flowing molten metal are not included in this work. The impact limiters are made of aluminum honeycomb. Honeycomb properties vary significantly depending on its density and cell configuration. We implement the honeycomb material properties used in the safety analysis report of another transport package ͓20͔. However, these properties do not include the possible effects of high temperature melting or combustion.
The spent fuel region properties are based on one PWR fuel assembly. This fuel type is chosen because its maximum heat generation rate is 2.5 kW, which is the greatest of any payload considered in the Safety Analysis Report of a licensed truck package ͓18͔.
Under steady and quasisteady state conditions, heat generated within the spent fuel assembly elevates its cladding temperature above that of the surrounding basket structure. This temperature rise is dependent on the heat generation rate and the thermal transport properties of the fuel assembly and backfill-gas region. The transport properties are affected by both thermal radiation and natural convection. The radiative properties depend on the emissivity of the fuel cladding and basket walls, and the geometric configuration of the fuel rods. The backfill-gas thermal properties and pressure as well as the fuel pin geometric configuration affect natural convection.
A highly simplified method for evaluating the time-dependent temperature distribution within the fuel/backfill-gas region is employed in this work. The fuel region is modeled as a homogenous cylinder whose dimensions are similar to that of a PWR assembly ͑see Fig. 5͒ . The volume fractions of fuel, cladding, and air within the fuel/backfill-gas region were calculated. The effective density, specific heat, and thermal conductivity for the cylinder are volume fraction averages of these three components. The total fuel heat generation rate is applied uniformly throughout the cylindrical volume.
The volume-averaged properties model some aspects of conduction heat transfer in the fuel/backfill-gas region. It is not currently known if this approach under-or over predicts the conduction heat transfer rates. However, this analysis completely neglects the effect of natural convection and thermal radiation. Development of an accurate thermal model for spent nuclear fuel is outside the scope of this work. Further analysis is needed to more accurately understand and model heat transfer in this region ͓21-23͔.
Under normal transport conditions, natural convection heat transfer in the liquid filled neutron shield tank is modeled as conduction using an effective thermal conductivity of 16.17 W / m K ͓18͔. Air fills the gap between the fuel and the aluminum basket. Air also fills the interior of the neutron shield tank during and after the fire. Heat transfer across these air gaps is modeled as a combination of conduction through stagnant air and view factor radiation from surface to surface. The emissivity of the fuel region is 0.8, while the emissivity of the metal surfaces is 0.36 ͓18͔.
Package Response Simulations
Simulation sequence The 10CFR71 regulations specify that under normal conditions of transport, the package receives 193.8 W / m 2 of insolation, and transfers heat to a 38°C surrounding by radiation and natural convection ͓1͔. In this work, steady state package simulations are performed for these conditions to determine the package temperature distribution before the fire. The package outer surface emissivity is assumed to be 0.36 ͓18͔. Under these conditions, heat generated within the spent fuel causes the interior components to be hotter than the exterior ones. The prefire simulation for the intact version of the package includes the impact limiter. The prefire calculation of the no-impactlimiter version does not. The no-impact-limiter simulations therefore model situations in which the impact limiters are removed long before the fire begins.
CAFE is used to simulate the response of the package to a 7.2-m-diameter pool fire for fire durations of D =3 h ͑six times the regulatory duration͒. The package temperature distribution at the end of the fire is used as the initial condition for postfire simulations. The postfire simulations use the normal conditions of transportation environment.
The temperatures of several package components are monitored during and after the simulated fire. The temperature of the seal is monitored at its top, bottom, and both sides. The temperatures of several other components are monitored at the package midplane, roughly halfway between the two ends. The dots in Fig. 5͑b͒ show the radial locations of the midplane temperature probes at the fuel center, fuel edge, fuel basket inner surface, gamma shield centerline, and the neutron shield cover.
In this work, the temperature of concern for spent fuel cladding is T C,clad = 866 K ͑593°C, 1100°F͒ ͓24͔ and for the elastomer seal is T C,seal = 664 K ͑391°C, 735°F͒ ͓18͔. The temperatures of concern for the lead gamma shield and aluminum basket were T C,GS = 601 K ͑328°C, 662°F͒ and T C,basket = 855 K ͑582°C, 1080°F͒, respectively. These temperatures are the melting points of the component materials ͓19͔. The properties of the gamma shield, basket, fuel cladding, and seal change at their temperatures of concern. This paper does not evaluate whether these property changes affect the performance of a component. Moreover, packages generally employ multiple components for containment, criticality, and shielding safety. This paper does not evaluate whether malfunction of a single component affects the performance of the entire package system.
Fire simulation computational domain.
The package FE models shown in Figs. 4 and 5 are linked to fire region computational domains. These CFD domains are very similar to that shown in Fig. 3 for the benchmark simulations ͓14,15͔. The outer dimensions of the domain are unchanged but the shape of the object suspended over the pool is different. The lowest point of the truck package expansion tank is 1.07 m above the ground, and the truck package axis is aligned within the same direction as the calorimeter axis in Fig. 3 . The number of elements in the CFD domain for the intact truck package response simulations is 62,328, while the domain for the package without its impact limiter is 84,672. The same pool size and fuel injection rate, combustion chemistry and radiation heat transfer models, as well as the wind fence model used in the benchmark calculation are employed in the package response simulations.
The measured wind conditions presented in Fig. 2 are applied to the side boundaries of the package response simulation. The wind condition time is rescaled so that the 30 min of wind data from the benchmark experiment ͓16͔ are applied during the entire 180 min package response simulation. Future work may determine if the results are significantly changed if the measured wind conditions are repeated six times without rescaling the time to cover the 180 min fire simulations.
Six different package/location configurations are considered in this work. Configurations 1, 2, and 3 are for an intact package. In Configuration 1, the package is centered over the fuel pool. In that case, the horizontal offset distance between the centers of the package and pool is Y off = 0. In Configuration 3, the containment seal is centered over the pool. The center of the package is offset from the center of the pool by a distance Y off = 2.5 m. In Configuration 2, Y off = 1 m. Configurations 4, 5, and 6 examine the noimpact-limiter version of the package with Y off = 0 m, 1 m, and 2.5 m, respectively.
Fire surface. Figure 6 shows snapshots of the fire surface from four of the six simulation configurations. It shows the locations where the soot volume fraction equals f S,m = 0.5 ppm. These surfaces are colored according to their local temperature. The fire surface moves with time but the ones in Fig. 6 are representative of the fire shape for each configuration. In Configurations 1 and 4, the packages are centered over the fuel pool and they are almost entirely engulfed in flames. In Configurations 3 and 6, the packages are offset axially by Y off = 2.5 m and the unengulfed ends are seen to the left of the fires.
Intact package centered over pool. Figure 7 shows the temperature response of the fuel, basket, gamma shield, and the neutron shield cover. These results are for Configuration 1 ͑intact package centered over the fuel pool͒ for a 3 h fire duration. The vertical line shows the time when the fire is extinguished and the postfire conditions begin. The simulations monitor the temperature of each component at multiple locations on the package midplane. Figure  7 shows the maximum of these temperatures at each time step.
The neutron shield cover temperature rises rapidly at the beginning of the fire, oscillates with fire motion, and decreases rapidly when the fire is extinguished. The interior components are more thermally massive and further away from the fire. As a result, they respond more slowly to changes in the fire. The gamma shield, basket, and fuel temperatures continue to increase after the fire is extinguished. This is because heat continues to diffuse to these interior components from the hotter exterior regions of the package.
The horizontal line segment in Fig. 7 marked T C,GS shows the gamma shield temperature of concern, which is the melt temperature for lead. As shown in Fig. 5͑b͒ , the gamma shield temperature is monitored halfway between its inner and outer radii. At that location, the gamma shield reaches its temperature of concern at t = 1.58 h. Just before this time, the rate of temperature change ͑slope͒ decreases due to constant temperature melting that takes place in the outer regions of the gamma shield. The slope increases abruptly after the monitored location changes phase. The aluminum fuel basket exhibits less rapid slope variations. While it does not melt, its temperature is affected by the constant temperature phase change of the lead gamma shield.
The gamma shield temperature is only monitored at two locations. More extensive monitoring is required to determine the fraction of the gamma shield that melts during the fire. Neither the fuel nor the basket reaches its temperatures of concern at their monitored locations. However, the current simulations do not determine if these components reach these temperatures at other locations. Figure 8 shows the seal temperature versus time for Configuration 1. The simulations monitor the seal at its top, bottom, and on both sides. The results in this figure show the maximum of these temperatures at each time step. The horizontal dashed line marked The line marked CAFE, D = 3 h shows results from the CAFE simulation of a 3 h fire duration. The seal reaches its temperature of concern at t = 2.25 h. It reaches its maximum temperature of T S,max = 496°C at t = 3.15 h, 0.15 h after the fire is extinguished. In this work, we define the temperature excess as the maximum amount the seal temperature exceeds its temperature of concern ⌬T E = T S,max − T C,seal . For this configuration, the temperature excess is ⌬T E = 106°C. The excess time is the total amount of time the seal exceeds its temperature of concern. For this configuration, ⌬t E = 4.4 h.
The predicted seal response is somewhat dependent on the fire model used in the simulation. For comparison, the line in Fig. 8  marked 10CFR71 , D = 3 h shows the maximum seal temperature calculated using the simplified fire model described in the 10CFR71 regulations. The model employs a specified fire temperature of 1073 K and a fire emissivity of 0.9, and the same prefire and postfire conditions as the CAFE simulations. Simulations using this model indicate that seal first reaches its temperature of concern at t = 2.26 h, which is essentially the same as the CAFE result. However, the seal exceeds its temperature of concern by a maximum of ⌬T E = 87°C, which is 19°C less than the CAFE simulation. Moreover, it spends a total of ⌬t E = 5.7 h above the temperature of concern, which is 1.3 h longer than the result from the other simulations.
The fire duration of concern for the seal D C is determined using an iterative process. Simulations are performed with different fire durations to determine the minimum duration that causes the maximum seal to reach its temperature of concern. CAFE simulations indicate that the duration of concern for Configuration 1 is D C = 2.1 h. The 10CFR71 simulations give a slightly larger value of D C = 2.2 h. The maximum seal temperature versus time from these simulations is shown in Fig. 8 as the curves marked CAFE,
Effects of position and impact limiter. The response of intact and no-impact-limiter packages to 3 h fires was simulated for offset distances of Y off = 0, 1, and 2.5 m. For all six configurations, the seal exceeds its temperature of concern before the end of the fire. Figures 9͑a͒ and 9͑b͒ show the temperature excess ͑maxi-mum amount the seal temperature exceeds its temperature of concern, ⌬T E = T M,seal − T C,seal ͒ and excess time ͑total time the seal spends above its temperature of concern͒ versus offset distance for both packages. Solid symbols represent results from CAFE simulations. These results are connected by straight lines for clarity, but the actual trends between the calculated points may be different. Results from the simplified fire model in the 10CFR71 regulations are presented for a fully engulfing fire for Y off = 0 using open symbols.
The CAFE simulations indicate that for the intact package centered over the pool ͑Y off =0͒, the seal exceeds its temperature of concern by a maximum amount of ⌬T E = 106°C, and the seal spends a total of ⌬t E = 4.4 h above that temperature. When the intact package is offset by Y off = 1 m and 2.5 m, the temperature excess and excess time both decrease to roughly ⌬T E = 46°C and ⌬t E = 3 h. The seal end of the intact package is protected by the impact limiter. A large fraction of the heat reaching the seal from the fire must conduct through the package body. As Y off increases, the fraction of the package engulfed in flames decreases. This decreases the heat transfer to the seal and reduces ⌬T E and ⌬t E compared to Y off =0.
The temperature excess and excess times are both significantly larger for the no-impact-limiter package than for the intact package. This is because the impact limiter insulates the seal end of the package from the fire.
For the intact package, ⌬T E and ⌬t E are both smaller when the package is not centered over the pool than they are for Y off =0. However, the opposite trend is observed for the no-impact-limiter package. When the impact limiter is removed, heat from the fire is able to transfer directly to the exposed end of the package to the seal. The seal end is nearer the center of the fire for Y off = 1 m and 2.5 m than for Y off = 0, and the central region may be hotter than the edge. This may be the reason that ⌬T E and ⌬t E are higher when Y off Ͼ 0 compared to Y off =0.
The 10CFR71 calculation for the intact package gives a smaller temperature excess but a longer excess time than the CAFE simulation. For the no-impact-limiter package, the 10CFR71 calculation again gives a smaller temperature excess but a shorter excess time. Figure 10 shows the fire duration of concern versus offset distance for both the intact and no-impact-limiter packages. Results calculated by CAFE are once again presented using solid symbols The results from the two fire models are in fair agreement for Y off = 0. For the intact package, the duration of concern is 2.1 h when it is centered over the fuel pool, and it is higher for Y off = 1 m and 2.5 m. For the no-impact-limiter package, the duration of concern is 0.65 h when it is centered over the pool, and it decreases as Y off increases.
A series of simulations that consider more values of the offset location Y off are required to determine if the duration of concern D C is minimized at a certain locations. This may be useful information for risk analysts to determine the most hazardous package location relative to the fire. For both intact and no-impact-limiter packages, we expect D C to increase significantly once Y off is large enough so that the package is not appreciably engulfed in the fire. Future simulations may evaluate the minimum "safe" distance. This is the minimum distance between the fire and package for which an infinitely long duration fire will not cause the seal to reach its temperature of concern.
The difference between the intact and no-impact-limiter curves in Figs. 9 and 10 quantifies the level of thermal protection provided by impact limiters to seals within the package. For example, the presence of the impact limiter increases the duration of concern by over 1 h compared to the no-impact-limiter package. This result, however, is dependent on the impact limiter thermal properties used in the simulations ͓20͔. Future work may consider different impact limiter models.
Summary
A FE model of an intact legal-weight-truck package is constructed and linked to the CAFE fire model. Simulations of the package response to 3 h fires from a 7.2-m-diameter hydrocarbon pool are performed with the package centered over the pool, and offset axially from that location by 1 m and 2.5 m. In all simulations, the body package is 1 m above the fuel pool.
The simulations predict that the package containment seal exceeds its temperature of concern for all three package locations. Simulations of a no-impact-limiter version of the package are also performed to quantify the level of thermal protection the impact limiters provide. The minimum fire duration that causes the seal to reach its temperature of concern is determined for each configuration. When the center of the no-impact-limiter package is within 2.5 m of the pool center, 0.7 h fires are capable of causing the seal to reach its temperature of concern. By contrast, the intact package protects the seal in fires that last roughly 2 h. These results will help risk analysts and package designers better understand the dependence of package position and the role of the impact limiters on accident consequences. 
